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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent Gary Davis ("Davis"), Respondents Hammack 
Management, Inc. ("Employer") and Idaho State Insurance Fund ("Surety") and 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF'') entered 
into a negotiated Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants (the "Stipulation") pursuant 
to Rule 12.D of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure resulting in the Industrial 
Commission's ("Commission") issuance of the Order of Approval and Discharge, dated June 26, 
2014 (the "Order"), which dismissed Davis' claims with prejudice. The Order fully resolved 
Davis' claims based on injuries stemming from a workplace accident on November 9, 2004, and 
is a final judgment, or "award" of the Commission. Due to this Court's holdings in Corgatelli v. 
Steel West, Inc., decided after the Order was entered, Davis filed Claimant's Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling Which Interprets and Clarifies the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against 
Defendants and Order of Approval and Discharge Entered by the Industrial Commission on 
6.26.14, dated February 26, 2015 (the "Petition for Declaratory Ruling"), seeking to reform 
provisions of the Stipulation. The Commission denied Davis' Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
and Davis' subsequent motion for reconsideration. Davis appeals from the Commission's 
decisions and seeks a determination on whether the holding in Corgatel/i should be applied 
retroactively to a final award of the Commission. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Commission entered its Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, filed October 6, 
2015, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revise the Stipulation approved by final 
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decision of the Commission. (R: Vol. I, p. 109, l. 23-p.110, l. 1-5.) The Commission 
subsequently entered its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 
25, 2015 (R: Vol. I, p. 138.). Davis subsequently appealed the Commission's decisions. (R: 
Vol. I, p. 143.) 
C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
The Employer/Surety generally agrees with Davis ' Statement of Facts except as set forth 
herein. The parties negotiated and entered into the Stipulation with the intent to resolve Davis' 
claims and to apportion liability based on the existing interpretation of the Workers' 
Compensation Law. Consistent with the generally accepted understanding that total permanent 
disability is inclusive of impairment, and to avoid the risk of paying twice, Employer sought a 
credit for the amount of permanent physical impairment ("PPI") benefits paid against 
Employer's allocation of total and permanent disability benefits. At the time the Stipulation was 
entered into by the parties, the entitlement to a credit was commonplace and accepted as implicit 
in this Court's holding in Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept. 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54. 
The Order approving the Stipulation was entered by the Commission dismissing Davis' claims 
with prejudice. In entering the Order, the Commission found that the Stipulation was in the 
"interests of justice and the best interests of the parties." (R: Vol. I, p. 11, 112-3.) Based on this 
Court's subsequent decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., Davis filed his Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling seeking to re-open the Commission's final decision and reform the 
Stipulation. (R: Vol. I, p. 13.) The Petition for Declaratory Ruling was not a new action; rather, 
Davis filed the pleading using the existing Commission case number in the original underlying 
matter. The Commission denied the Petition for Declaratory Ruling holding, in part, the 
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Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reform the Stipulation and that the Corgatelli 
decision did not apply retroactively. (R: Vol. I, p.109, 1.23 - p. 110, 1. 1-4.) In response, Davis 
filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the Industrial Commission' s October 6, 2015 Order on 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, which was denied by the Commission in its Order Denying 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (R: Vol. I, p. 113; p. 138.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Surety and Employer are seeking an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11.2 on the grounds and for the reasons that the Notice of Appeal and 
Appellant's Brief were filed frivolously and for an improper purpose as set forth below. 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review on Appeal. 
"When this Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it exercises free 
review over questions of law but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial 
and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings." Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 
Idaho 287, 290,335 P.3d 1150, 1153 (2014), reh'g denied (Oct. 29, 2014), citing Vawter v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 906- 07, 318 P.3d 893, 896-97 (2014). "Substantial 
evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Id. , citing Zapata v. 
J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P .2d 1178, 1180 (1999). All facts and inferences are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Id., citing 
Zapata, 132 Idaho at 515, 975 P.2d at 1180. The Court exercises free review over issues of 
statutory interpretation. Id., citing Sanders v. Bd. ofTrs. of Mountain Home Sch. Dist. No. I 93, 
156 Idaho 269,272, 322 P.3d 1002, 1005 (2014). 
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B. The Order of Approval and Discharge Dated June 26, 2014, Entered Pursuant to 
the Stipulation for Entry of Award Against Defendants, Dismissed the Complaint in 
the Underlying Matter With Prejudice, Barring Any Further Proceedings. 
I. The Order dismissing the Complaint with prejudice bars Davis' attempt to reform 
the Stipulation. 
The parties resolved the underlying workers' compensation claim by entering into a 
Stipulation. (R: Vol. I, pp. 1-10.) As a result, the Commission entered its Order on June 26, 
2014, approving the Stipulation and dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. (R: Vol. I, p. 11.) 
(Emphasis added.) "A dismissal with prejudice connotes an adjudication or final determination 
on the merits and extinguishes or bars any future claim." Telford v. Smith County, Texas, 155 
Idaho 497, 504, 314 P .3d 179, 186 (2013) ( additional citations omitted). The Order constituted a 
final, appealable order disposing of all of Davis' claims. The Commission did not indicate any 
intent to retain jurisdiction over the underlying case. See Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 
118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309 (1990). 
Idaho Code § 72-718 further supports finding the Order is final as there was no motion 
for reconsideration or appeal of the Order: 
A decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be 
final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the 
commission upon filing the decision in the office of the 
commission; provided, within twenty (20) days from the date of 
filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or 
rehearing of the decision, or the commission may rehear or 
reconsider its decision on its own initiative, and in any such events 
the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or 
reconsideration or the filing of the decision on rehearing or 
reconsideration. Final decisions may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court as provided by section 72-7241, Idaho Code. 
11 Idaho Code § 72-724 states: "[ a ]n appeal may be made to the Supreme Court by such parties 
from such decisions and orders of the commission and within such times and in such manner as 
prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court." 
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Idaho Code§ 72-718 (emphasis added). 
Davis did not move for reconsideration and he did not appeal the Order. Failure to timely 
appeal the Order deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Idaho Code§§ 72-718, 72-724; See also 
Hansen v. Denney, 158 Idaho 304,308,346 P.3d 321,325 (2015); Freeman v. Sunshine Min. 
Co., 75 Idaho 292,271 P.2d 1022 (1954) ("Requirements of statutes relative to perfecting an 
appeal in a workmen's compensation case are mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to 
comply therewith deprives court of jurisdiction.") 
This Court previously upheld the Commission's decision to dismiss a claimant's petition 
for determination as to the correct amount of compensation on the grounds claimant failed to 
timely move to reconsider or appeal the agreement, precluding further proceedings concerning 
the correct disability rate. Drake v. State, Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P .2d 
397 (1996). In Drake, claimant entered into a lump sum settlement agreement resolving all 
claims. Id. A year and a half later, claimant petitioned the Commission seeking a determination 
as to the proper compensation amount, asserting that ISIF was paying below the agreed upon 
"statutory rate." Id. The Commission dismissed the petition asserting the agreement fully 
adjudicated the compensation issue. Id. On review, this Court found the lump sum settlement 
agreement2 constituted a final decision of the Commission, and held: 
The Agreement between Drake and the ISIF contemplated 
payment at the statutory rate and stated that Drake was earning 
$5.06 an hour. Furthermore, the Agreement explicitly stated that 
"no portion is a mere recital." With this in mind, we believe the 
Commission correctly determined that the $5.06 hourly wage in 
2 The fact the claimant in Drake had entered into a lump sum settlement agreement is of no 
particular significance as the agreement constituted a final decision of the Commission, which 
has the same effect as the Order in this matter. 
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the Agreement was the base rate to be used in computing Drake's 
average weekly wage. If Drake believed that his hourly wage was 
something other than the $5.06 amount. the time to have raised this 
issue was during the settlement process or by way of a motion for 
rehearing or reconsideration. Drake's failure to due [sic] so 
prohibits further proceedings concerning the correct permanent 
disability rate under the Agreement. We affirm the Commission's 
decision to dismiss the petition. 
Id. at 882, 920 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added). 
As Davis failed to seek reconsideration of or appeal the Order, he is prohibited from 
further proceedings concerning the credit issue under the Stipulation. 
Alternatively, Davis' claim seeking to set aside the credit is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. This Court has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to agency decisions, 
including decisions of the Industrial Commission. Magee, 152 Idaho at 202,268 P.3d at 470, 
citing Welch v: Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 516, 915 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1996). 
"A valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim." Wernecke v. 
St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 40 I, 14 7 Idaho 277, 288, 207 P .3d 1008, 1019 (2009), citing 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). "Claim preclusion, or res 
judicata, bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim." Id., citing 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). 
The Order constitutes a valid final judgment by the Commission. The issue of the 
Employer/Surety's entitlement to a credit was fully "adjudicated" by the Commission as the 
credit was specifically addressed in Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation. (R: Vol. I, p. 6, ,r 12.) 
Finally, the parties in the underlying workers' compensation action resulting in the entry of the 
Order dismissing Davis' claims with prejudice are the same as the parties to Davis' Petition for 
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Declaratory Ruling and this appeal. Under the facts and circumstances of this case res judicata 
should bar Davis' claim to set aside the credit, which was previously brought to conclusion in 
2014. 
Likewise, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to modify the Stipulation. Idaho Code § 
72-719 sets forth the limited circumstances under which the Commission would be able to 
modify the Order, none of which apply in this matter: 
(1) On application made by a party in interest filed with the 
commission at any time within five (5) years of the date of the 
accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an 
occupational disease, on the ground of a change in conditions, the 
commission may, but not oftener than once in six (6) months, 
review any order, agreement or award upon any of the following 
grounds: 
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury 
or disablement; or 
(b) Fraud. 
(2) The commission on such review may make an award ending, 
diminishing or increasing the compensation previously agreed 
upon or awarded, subject to the maximum and minimum provided 
in this law, and shall make its findings of fact, rulings of law and 
order or award, file the same in the office of the commission, and 
immediately send a copy thereof to the parties. 
(3) The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) 
years of the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first 
manifestation of an occupational disease, may review a case in 
order to correct a manifest injustice. 
(4) This section shall not apply to a commutation of payments 
under section 72-404(, Idaho Code]. 
Idaho Code § 72-719. 
The Stipulation identifies the date of the accident causing the injury as November 9, 
2004. (R: Vol. I, p.2.) Claimant's Petition for Declaratory Ruling was not filed until February 
26, 2015, more than ten ( 10) years after the accident date. (R: Vol. I, p.13.) Furthermore, Davis 
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is not claiming a change in the nature or extent of his injuries or disablement, or fraud. 
Therefore, grounds have not been established to modify the terms of the Stipulation. 
Davis cannot end-run a jurisdictional issue by filing a declaratory action, in the same 
previously dismissed case, requesting the Commission reform the terms of the Stipulation. It is 
important to properly characterize the Stipulation. The Stipulation is not a lump-sum settlement 
agreement as contemplated by Idaho Code§ 72-4043, or a compensation agreement under Idaho 
Code § 72-7114; rather the Stipulation is an agreement among the parties to resolve the 
underlying claims, which is authorized pursuant to Rule 12.D, JRP, which states: "The 
Commission may, on presentation of sufficient grounds or good cause, dismiss a complaint 
pursuant to stipulation by the parties." 5 See also Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407,410, 
111 P.3d 92, 95 (2005) (Court held dismissals of workers' compensation claims under Idaho 
Code §§ 72-404, 72-711 are not the only method to permanently settle claims; stipulations to 
dismiss with prejudice are appropriate.) 
"A stipulation is a contract, and we will apply contractual principles of interpretation 
when reviewing a stipulation." Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007), 
3 Idaho Code§ 72-404 states: "[w]henever the commission determines that it is for the best 
interest of all parties, the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the 
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or 
more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the commission." 
4 Idaho Code § 72-711 states: "[i]f the employer and the afflicted employee reach an agreement 
in regard to compensation under this law, a memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the 
commission, and, if approved by it, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be an 
award by the commission and be enforceable under the provisions of section 72-735, unless 
modified as provided in section 72-719. An agreement shall be approved by the commission only 
when the terms conform to the provisions of this law." 
5 The Comments to Subsection D state, in pertinent part: "In those situations where ... the 
dismissal will be with prejudice, the stipulation must contain sufficient information for the 
Commission to approve the request." 
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citing Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005); Win of 
Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 750-51, 53 P.3d 330, 333-34 (2002). "The 
determination and legal effect of a contractual provision is a question of law." Id., citing 
Maroun, 141 Idaho at 611, 114 P.3d at 981. Our primary objective when interpreting a contract 
is to discover the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract is made. Id., citing 
Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002). "If possible, 
the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best 
indication of their intent." Id. 
The Stipulation was not a contract of adhesion. The terms of the Stipulation were 
negotiated by the parties. This Court's decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., decided an issue 
of first impression holding there is no statutory authority for an employer to receive credit for 
PPI benefits paid before the award of total and permanent disability benefits. 157 Idaho 287, 292, 
335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014). Prior to the Corgatelli decision it was long-standing, common 
practice for the employer to be entitled to a credit for PPI due to the understanding that total 
permanent disability is inclusive of impairment.6 See Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 
107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984); Nielson v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 106 Idaho 878, 
6 Since the Carey decision, employers have been entitled to a credit for PPI benefits paid prior to 
the time a claimant was deemed to be totally and permanently disabled. This is how the system 
has worked for thirty plus years. As it was generally accepted in the normal course and scope of 
cases involving ISIF it was not challenged, and therefore, there is a dearth of case law addressing 
the credit issue, particularly as it was accepted by all. It cannot be overstated that Corgatelli 
presents a sea change in how total and permanent disability cases will be resolved, with a 
negative downside falling on the injured employee as sureties will be resistant to paying 
permanent impairment benefits until disability is determined. See, Lori (Stogner) Brownlee, 
Claimant, IC 2007-017523, 2015 WL 4994297, at *14 (Idaho Ind. Com. July 20, 2015). 
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684 P.2d 280 (1984)7. The impact of Corgatelli is significant: either the employer pays PPI 
benefits timely and accepts the risk of paying twice if claimant is later deemed totally and 
permanently disabled, or claimant goes without PPI benefits during litigation. However, at the 
time Davis' claim was resolved by Stipulation, Corgatelli had not been decided, and the credit 
for PPI previously paid was accepted by all workers, compensation practitioners, and by the 
parties to the Stipulation. 
The fact a credit was being claimed was not hidden. Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation 
states, in pertinent part: ''Notwithstanding any other provision herein, Surety is entitled to a 
credit of 160 weeks, or $46,992 against its obligation to pay 250 weeks of total and permanent 
disability benefits to [Davis] beginning October 1, 2013, leaving a total of 90 weeks of benefits 
to be paid by Surety,, (R: Vol. I, p . 6.) If Davis did not believe the Surety was entitled to a credit 
then he could have negotiated that provision out of the Stipulation, but he did not. Likewise, if 
there so obviously was a lack of statutory authority, Davis could have refused to sign the 
Stipulation or immediately appealed the Order and asserted arguments similar to those made in 
Corgatelli, which was not done. Finally, the Corgatelli decision was issued in August 2014, 
with rehearing denied in October of 2014. Davis' Petition for Declaratory Ruling (R: Vol. I, pp. 
13-17) was not filed until Febmary 26, 2015, nearly eight (8) months after the Order was 
entered. 
7 See also, Daryl Patterson, Claimant, IC 2006-505350, IC 2009-004209, 2011 WL 6042996, at 
*17-18 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 10, 2011); Trudy Deon, Claimant, IC 2007-005950, IC 2008-
032836, 2013 WL 6699885, at *11 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 4, 2013); Sidney Hurst, Claimant, IC 
95-944570, 1999 WL 222527, at *12-13 (Idaho Ind. Com. Mar. 26, 1999), etc. 
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As the credit was a negotiated term of the Stipulation, and the Order is a final 
determination on the merits, the Commission was correct in finding it did not have jurisdiction to 
review, or reform the Stipulation. (R: Vol. I, pp. 109-110.) 
C. The Surety's entitlement to a credit for PPI benefits previously paid to Davis set 
forth in Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation is valid and does not constitute an 
impermissible waiver under Idaho Code§ 72-318(2). 
Idaho Code§ 72-318(2) provides: "[n]o agreement by an employee to waive his rights to 
compensation under this act shall be valid." Whether a contract violates a statute is a question of 
law for the Court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Wernecke, 147 
Idaho at 281,207 P.3d at 1012, citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). 
A contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter prohibited by statute is illegal, 
unenforceable, and void. Id., citing Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d 
1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999) (citing Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 
Idaho 522,525,263 P. 632,633 (1928)). 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case the Stipulation was not an "agreement by 
an employee to waive his rights to compensation under [the Workers' Compensation] act." This 
Court's decision in Emery v. JR. Simplot Co is controlling. 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005). 
In Emery, claimant was injured, and later filed a claim seeking additional compensation from his 
employer. Id. at 408-409, 111 P.3d at 93-94. Claimant's counsel advised him of the risks and 
expense of proceeding and the parties agreed to stipulate to dismiss with prejudice. Id. at 409, 
111 P.3d at 94. The Stipulation was approved by the Commission and an order was entered. Id. 
Claimant retained new counsel and moved to vacate the Commission's dismissal of his claim, 
which was ultimately denied. Id. On appeal, claimant asserted the stipulation to dismiss his 
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claim with prejudice constituted an invalid agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-318(2). Id at 
410, 111 P.3d at 95. The Court disagreed and held: 
Emery's argument focuses on I.C. § 72-318(2). However, the 
stipulation to dismiss Emery's claim with prejudice is not an 
"agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation 
under [the Workers' Compensation] act." LC.§ 72-318(2). Emery 
was not waiving his rights to compensation under the act. He 
stipulated to dismiss his claim with respect to the injury he 
suffered on March 10, 2001. The stipulation did not relieve 
Simplot of liability for any injury he might suffer in the future 
while employed by Simplot. Emery and Simplot agreed to resolve 
the specific claim at issue in this case. The Commission's finding 
that the parties had not created a "scheme" to avoid the employer's 
obligations under the workers' compensation statutes is supported 
by substantial evidence. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court's decision in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401 is not on point, 
but supports the analysis in Emery. In Wernecke, the Court held Idaho Code § 72-318(2) applies 
to all agreements purporting to waive rights to compensation under the statute, not just 
agreements between employers and employees. 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 1008, 1013 
(2009). In that case, the claimant was injured and settled her claim with the employer and the 
State Insurance Fund. Id. at 280-281, 207 P .3d at 1011-1012. She later entered into a lump sum 
settlement agreement with ISIP. Id. As part of that agreement the ISIP denied that claimant was 
totally and permanently disabled and barred her from recovering any additional compensation 
from ISIP for any claim of any nature. Id. Claimant was subsequently injured and filed a 
complaint against ISIP. Id. ISIP asserted claimant was barred from any further recovery due to 
the prior settlement. Id. The claimant in Wernecke conceded that based on this Court's holding 
in Emery, Idaho Code § 72-318 permits a claimant to compromise a claim arising out of a past 
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injury. Id. at 283-284, 207 P.3d at 1014-1015. The Court held, "agreements attempting to waive 
compensation rights stemming from future unknown injuries are generally invalid." Id. at 284, 
207 P.3 at 1015. 
Like Emery, Davis' pending case was resolved by Stipulation. There was no intent to 
waive compensation rights stemming from future unknown injuries. Additionally, at the time the 
parties entered into the agreement, it was the general and common practice among practitioners 
to allow the Surety a credit for the previously paid PPL See Carey, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54; 
Nielson, 106 Idaho 878, 684 P.2d 280.8 This was the intent and the understanding amongst the 
parties and likely why Davis did not challenge the inclusion of the credit in Paragraph 12 of the 
Stipulation at the time it was signed. Certainly, there was no "scheme" to avoid payments due 
and owing under the Law. There is simply no impermissible waiver of rights in the Stipulation. 
D. As a Case of First Impression, the Holding in Corgatelli Should Not Be Applied 
Retroactively. 
The holding in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc. should not apply retroactively due to the 
number of cases that would have to be reopened and the significant unanticipated financial harm 
to employers. 
The usual rule is that decisions of this Court apply retroactively to 
all past and pending cases. State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d 
305 (1978). For policy reasons, however, this Court has discretion 
to limit the retroactive application of a particular decision. We may 
hold that it does not apply even to the case in which the decision 
was announced; or that it applies only to that case and not to other 
past or pending cases; or that it applies to both that case and 
pending cases, but not to past cases. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 
8 See also, Daryl Patterson, Claimant, IC 2006-505350, IC 2009-004209, 2011 WL 6042996, at 
*17-18 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 10, 2011); Trudy Deon, Claimant, IC 2007-005950, IC 2008-
032836, 2013 WL 6699885, at *11 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 4, 2013); Sidney Hurst, Claimant, IC 
95-944570, 1999 WL 222527, at * 12-13 (Idaho Ind. Com. Mar. 26, 1999), etc. 
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606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977). When deciding whether to limit the 
retroactive application of a decision, we weigh three factors: (1) 
the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law; and 
(3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is 
applied retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 
1365 (1974). We balance the first factor against the other two to 
determine whether to limit the retroactive application of the 
decision. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977). 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P .3d 315, 320 (2004). 
In balancing the factors, the retroactive application of Corgatelli should be limited and 
should not be applied to past decisions. 
1. The purpose of the Corgatelli decision was statutory interpretation. 
This Court's decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc. decided an issue of first impression 
holding there is no statutory authority for an employer to receive credit for PPI benefits paid 
before the award of total and permanent disability benefits. 157 Idaho 287,292, 335 P.3d 1150, 
1155 (2014). 
2. Reliance upon the prior law. 
Based in significant part on this Court's decision in Carey, which apportioned liability for 
non-medical factors in total and permanent disability cases between the employer/surety and 
ISIF, there was general recognition that the Carey decision stood for the proposition that total 
and permanent disability was inclusive of impairment. 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984). As a 
result, employer/surety was entitled to a credit in the amount of PPI benefits paid prior to a 
determination of total and permanent disability. There has been significant reliance on the ruling 
in the Carey decision in the thirty-two (32) years since its issuance. 
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3. The effect upon the administration of justice if the Corgatelli decision is applied 
retroactively is significant. 
This third factor weighs "the number of cases that would be reopened if the decision is 
applied retroactively." BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320. As set forth 
above, prior to the Corgatelli decision, and based on the Carey decision, it was long-standing, 
common practice for the employer to be entitled to a credit for PPI benefits paid due to the 
understanding that impairment is inclusive of total permanent disability. There are likely 
thousands of potential cases at risk for being re-opened if Corgatelli is applied retroactively. If 
Corgatelli is applied retroactively employers will be significantly harmed due to this unplanned 
and unforeseen new liability. 
Based on the foregoing, the balancing of the above factors weighs in favor of declining to 
extend Corgatelli retroactively. 
E. The Commission Did Not Err in Ruling Davis Was Not Entitled to an Award of 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. 
Idaho Code§ 72-804 states: 
If the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are 
brought under law determines that the employer or his surety 
contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee 
or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable ground, 
or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused within a 
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to 
pay to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation 
provided by law, or without reasonable grounds discontinued 
payment of compensation as provided by law justly due and owing 
to the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided 
by this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by 
injured employees or their dependents shall be fixed by the 
commission. 
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The decision that grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney's fees is a factual determination 
which rests with the Commission. Lopez v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 107 Idaho 590,591,691 
P.2d 1205, 1206 (1984). The determination that a claimant is not entitled to attorney fees will be 
affirmed if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 
145 Idaho 302, 311-312, 179 P.3d 265, 274-275 (2008). 
Davis has failed to show entitlement to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804. The 
underlying workers' compensation claim was fully resolved by a negotiated Stipulation resulting 
in the Commission entering the Order dismissing Davis' claims with prejudice. Pursuant to the 
terms of the Stipulation, the Employer and Surety acknowledged their obligation to make 
payments under the Workers' Compensation Law and the parties agreed to the apportionment of 
liability for non-medical factors. (R: Vol. I, p. 4, ,r 8; pp. 4-5, ,r10.) Davis did not seek 
reconsideration of or appeal from the Order. He cannot thereafter submit a demand for 
additional payment inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation (R: Vol. I, pp. 53-54), and then 
seek an award of attorney fees for non-payment under Idaho Code § 72-804. Such action is not a 
"contested" claim as contemplated by the statute and the Commission, Employer and Surety 
were reasonable in their reliance on the terms of the Stipulation. Davis is therefore not entitled to 
an award of fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804. 
F. The Employer and Surety are Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees Pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. 
The Employer and Surety request they be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending 
this appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, which states, in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that 
the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, 
brief or other document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
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I.A.R. 11.2. 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that 
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other 
document is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the imposition of sanctions pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 is warranted as (a) the Notice of Appeal (R: Vol. I, p. 143) and the 
Appellant's Brief are not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. Additionally, a 
good faith argument has not been made for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; and (b) the Notice of Appeal and Appellant's Brief were filed for the improper purpose to 
harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
Here, Davis failed to seek reconsideration of or appeal from the Order approving the 
Stipulation, negotiated by the parties, dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. At the time the 
Stipulation was entered into, there was no question as to the Employer/Surety's entitlement to 
the credit at issue evidenced by Davis' signature on the Stipulation. The Order was a final award 
barring any subsequent actions. The Petition for Declaratory Ruling attempted to circumvent the 
jurisdictional deadlines that had already run. Thus, this appeal was brought without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law and for an improper purpose. 
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Of significance is the fact Davis could have raised the arguments made in Corgatel/i v. 
Steel West, Inc., in the underlying matter, but elected to proceed with entering into the 
Stipulation. Additionally, Davis failed to seek reconsideration of or an appeal from the Order for 
the purpose of asserting the arguments that ultimately prevailed in Corgatelli. The Order was 
entered constituting a final award of the Commission on June 26, 2014. As the time for 
reconsideration or appeal from the Order had passed, the Commission did not have jurisdiction 
to consider Davis' Petition for Declaratory Ruling. See Idaho Code§§ 72-718 and 72-724. 
Alternatively, Davis' subsequent action is barred by the doctrine of resjudicata. See Magee v. 
Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196,202,268 P.3d 464,470 (2012). As the law is well-
settled, the appeal is frivolous and without basis in fact or law and was only made for the 
improper purpose to harass or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling and the Order Denying Petitioner's Motion 
for Reconsideration of the Commission should be affirmed and the Respondents awarded their 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this f '2,1\t\ day of May, 2016. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By:~Ll)y£}_, # -Jon.Bamrnm: Of the firm 
Attorneys for Respondents/Cross-Respondents, 
Hammack Management, Inc. and Idaho State 
Insurance Fund 
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